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Abstract
In recent years there has been a proliferation of scholarship on protests and
other forms of collective action in China. Important insights have been
gained into how conflicts between social groups and local governments
begin, which strategies and instruments protesters apply, and under which
circumstances protests are likely to succeed or fail. However, comparatively
little is known about the mobilizing structures and how such collective
action can be sustained over a long period of time, in some instances over
several years. Such perseverance would be remarkable even in a democracy,
but it is more so in an authoritarian system where the risks of participating in
collective action are higher and the chances to succeed much smaller. This
article compares the development of public protests in two research locations
and identifies four factors instrumental to overcoming the formidable chal-
lenges of sustaining collective action in China: the continuing existence of
substantial grievances; the re-activation of strong social ties; the presence
of unifying frames; and an adaptive protest leadership. The comparison
shows that the last factor is particularly crucial: while the two villages
were similar in all other respects, leadership in village B was far more adap-
tive than in village A, which goes a long way towards explaining why collec-
tive action could be sustained twice as long in village B.
Keywords: collective action; protest; mobilizing structures; social capital;
protest leadership; urbanizing China
In a hot and humid week in mid-August 2009, large-scale demonstrations broke
out almost simultaneously in two villages on the outskirts of Guangzhou city.
Although the demonstrations were peaceful and the protesters did little more
than hoist banners, shout slogans and recite speeches, village officials were
quite concerned. The protests particularly alarmed village officials for several
reasons. First of all, the turnout of these demonstrations was massive. In village
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A, the number of demonstrators ran into hundreds, while allegedly half the popu-
lation of village B (about 1,500 people) took to the streets. Second, the demon-
strators were well prepared: banners had been printed and speeches rehearsed.
Third, despite the scope and level of coordination, the officials had received no
intelligence that protests were being planned. Fourth, the demonstrators were
accusing the village authorities of corruption and demanding their removal.1
As with so many other cases of collective action in China today, the cause of
these demonstrations was land issues: the demonstrators had good reason to
fear that they would be insufficiently compensated in the transformation of
their village into a neighbourhood (shequ 社区) of Guangzhou city.2
A fifth matter that would have been of grave concern to the authorities, had
they known it at the time, was that these incidents only marked the beginning
of struggles that were to last a year in village A, and nearly twice as long in village
B. After the demonstrations were dispersed, the activists continued to protest
against the redevelopment schemes by means of petitioning to higher level auth-
orities and staging sit-ins at the designated construction sites. In village B,
between 100 and 150 villagers assembled at a construction site every morning
at 9:00 am and would spend the day there before walking back to their houses
in closed formation at 5:00 pm. In village A, about 20 to 30 villagers, most of
whom were elderly women, sat at the entrance of the village almost every day.
Direct action at Chinese grassroots level that is sustained for months or even
years is not particular to our research location, yet little is known about why col-
lective action in adverse circumstances can be sustained for such a long time.
Why do people continue to protest for years if higher-level governments clearly
have no intention of accommodating their demands? Why do they risk being stig-
matized, beaten up and arrested if their chances of success are so small? What
motivates them to return to protest sites day after day despite adverse conditions?
The perseverance of these protesters would be remarkable even in a democracy,
but it is more so in an authoritarian system where the risks of participating in col-
lective action are greater and the chances of success much smaller.
Comparing collective action in villages A and B allows us to address these
puzzles. Drawing on field research data collected by Xianwen Kuang between
January 2010 and June 2011,3 this article argues that four factors are instrumen-
tal in overcoming the formidable obstacles of sustaining collective action in
China: the continuing existence of substantial grievances; the re-activation of
social ties; the presence of unifying frames; and an adaptive protest leadership.
1 Video A, showing the assembly in village A, Guangzhou, taken by villagers on 17 August 2009; Video
B, showing the public meeting in village B, Guangzhou, taken by villagers on 22 August 2009.
2 Interviews BI1-5; Interviews BM2. For a list and explanation of interview codes used, please see
Appendix.
3 From mid-January to late February 2010, Xianwen Kuang interviewed activists, protestors, villagers, an
informant close to the protest leadership, journalists and a government official in the protest locations
(see Appendix). Brief on-site follow-up interviews were conducted throughout 2010. To learn about the
latest developments, several telephone interviews with key persons in the protests were conducted
throughout 2011.
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Despite their remarkable similarities, the two villages express marked differences
especially with respect to the last two dimensions. These differences go a long
way towards explaining why protests continued for twice as long in village B
as in village A.
Organizing and Sustaining Collective Action in China
Since the violent suppression of the Tiananmen protests in 1989, and especially
since the early 2000s, scholars have devoted much attention to collective
actions such as passive resistance, spontaneous uprisings, and planned and orga-
nized challenges to state authorities. This area of research has been covered
remarkably well despite the fact that the topic is sensitive and information
often difficult to obtain. Scores of articles and books provide insights into the
reasons for collective action,4 forms of collective action,5 its systemic conse-
quences,6 and the interplay between resistance and counter-resistance at the
village level.7 Despite this wealth of information, comparatively little is known
about how large-scale collective protests become organized and how such
action can be sustained over a long period of time, especially when protestors
receive no support from government officials, journalists, lawyers or other power-
ful allies.
These issues are at the heart of the theoretical literature on collective action. As
Mancur Olson has famously shown, there is no apparent reason for individuals to
engage in collective action aimed at achieving a common good: the costs are high,
the chances of success low, and individuals do not think that their participation
makes a difference. On the other hand, an individual will profit from successful
collective action even if he does not participate.8 The odds for engaging in collec-
tive action are even lower in a modern authoritarian state where the government
not only commands superior resources to quell dissent by force, but has also
become increasingly adept at controlling flows of information and monitoring
its population.9
Large-scale protests and revolutions occurring after the publication of Olson’s
seminal book prompted a re-evaluation of these pessimistic findings. While con-
firming the existence of a collective action problem, scholars provided expla-
nations of how it can be overcome. These explanations, which China scholars
quickly integrated into their analyses, focus on four dimensions: selective incen-
tives, frames, social capital and leadership.
Selective incentive theories stress that the collective action problem can be
overcome if obtaining private goods is made contingent upon an individual’s
4 See, e.g., Lee 2002; O’Brien and Li 1999; Zhou 1993.
5 See, e.g., Li, Lianjiang, 2006; O’Brien and Li, 2006.
6 See, e.g., Chung, Lai and Xia 2006; O’Brien and Li 2005.
7 See, e.g., Cai 2008; Cai 2003.
8 Olson 1965.
9 Göbel 2012.
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participation in an activity.10 The emergence of protests in China seems to con-
firm this: as Fayong Shi and Yongshun Cai have shown, collective action motiv-
ated by selective incentives can be sustained for a long time if success is perceived
to be within reach. The Shanghai homeowners they studied struggled for a decade
before their eventual success. Being able to capitalize on “disparate priorities
among different levels of state authorities” and to form alliances with officials
and journalists,11 they had high (and justified) hopes for success. However, pro-
tests have also been sustained for a long time in localities where conditions were
less favourable. Examples include the Beijing property owners studied by
You-tien Hsing,12 and the “Dingzhou Incident,” where activists had no media
support at all.13
The existing literature also highlights the importance of “frames” in collective
action.14 For example, Mark Lichbach stresses that a peasant movement will
degenerate into banditry if the dispersion of material rewards is not underpinned
by collective values.15 The importance of such frames is illustrated in several
other contributions16 which reveal that protesters not only relate their endeavours
to historical precedents and spatial symbolism, but also quite frequently clad
their demands in Maoist rhetoric. Again, while the presence of such frames
can help to account for participation in an activity, they alone are not sufficient
to sustain collective action.
Criticizing the “first generation” collective action theories such as those formu-
lated by Olson, Elinor Ostrom highlights the role of trust in solving the collective
action problem. Trust, Ostrom and Ahn argue, can take two forms: one that is
“reducible to other forms of social capital,”17 such as trust resulting from mul-
tiple and iterative interactions with positive outcomes, or trust that is backed
up by enforceable rules and regulations. The other form of trust, “a trustor’s
belief about a trustee’s motivation,” is not reducible.18 Trust as a solution to
the collective action problem has received little attention in China studies. An
exception is a recent contribution by Lianjiang Li and Kevin O’Brien on protest
leadership in rural China.19 The authors find that social capital is often (although
not always) important for becoming a protest leader, and even more so for mobi-
lizing supporters.20 Interestingly, they also point out that protest leaders utilize
10 Lichbach 1994.
11 Shi and Cai 2006.
12 Hsing 2010a.
13 Farmers in Dingzhou city, Henan province, camped for two years on land illegally sold to an electricity
company. When the farmers were attacked by 300 hired thugs in 2005, the central government stepped
in to resolve the conflict in favour of the occupiers.
14 For a useful introduction to different perspectives, see Johnston and Noakes 2005.
15 Lichbach 1994.
16 See, e.g., Chen 2008; Zuo and Benford 1995.
17 Ostrom and Ahn 2001, 20.
18 Ibid., 21. See also Ostrom 1990; Diani and McAdam 2003; Kitts 2000.
19 Li, Lianjiang, and O’Brien 2008.
20 Ibid., 7.
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not only trust, but also “the threat of violence, property destruction and social
ostracism” to prevent free riding.21
Leadership, another potential candidate for explaining sustained collective
action in China, has received equally scant attention. A potential starting point,
although not related to protests, is Yang Guobin’s analysis of “organizational
entrepreneurs” in the NGO sector22 whom he describes as individuals with the
knowledge and the will to mobilize resources to create a social organization.
As this brief overview illustrates, the picture of how collective action is sus-
tained in China is sketchy at best. By comparing two instances of collective action
from their initiation in the 1990s to their completion in 2010 (village A) and 2011
(village B), this article provides insights into how the severity of grievances, the
re-activation of strong social ties, and the utilization of frames can help to sustain
collective action in China. Most importantly, it illustrates that an adaptive leader-
ship is crucial for sustaining protests.
Grievances in China’s Urban Villages
The events described in the introduction to this article did not, as might be
expected, take place somewhere in rural China, but right inside the perimeters
of Guangzhou city. Moreover, village A and village B are not ordinary villages,
but merely shadows of their former selves: the fields that once surrounded their
buildings have long been requisitioned for urban development. Such chengzhong-
cun (城中村), which literally translates as “village(s) amid the city,” are not com-
mon in China, but are typical in some southern Chinese cities like Shenzhen and
Guangzhou which have spearheaded the present wave of urbanization in
China.23
Chengzhongcun are immediately recognizable as parcels of dilapidated
multi-story buildings dwarfed by high-rises caging them in on all four sides,
and result from the fact that land in rural China is subdivided into agricultural
and residential land. When residential land is converted, the peasants must
receive extra compensation for the structures already built on the land, such as
houses, sheds and stables. As You-tien Hsing vividly illustrates, land conversion
is a complicated process in which higher-level governments receive a much larger
share of the conveyance fees than village- or township-level governments.
Accordingly, the incentives for grassroots officials to short-change the residents
are high, making the conversion of residential land an extremely conflict-laden
process with low profit margins for grassroots administrations.24 It is perhaps
for this reason that in the past the urban authorities often requisitioned only
the agricultural land and left the residential land to the farmers. Their
21 Ibid. Compare this to officials’ utilization of relational capital to deter individuals from protesting in
Deng and O’Brien 2013.
22 Yang 2005.
23 Li, Tian 2008.
24 See Hsing 2010b.
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communities were then effectively encircled by the cities.25 However, as the cities
grew and land became increasingly precious, developers and city authorities natu-
rally began to covet these pieces of land.
The suspicion that earlier land sales had not been correctly budgeted for
became the cause of sporadic but regular appeals to higher-level governments
by a small number of individuals in both village A and B. These individuals
belonged to the sub-categories of “village elites” identified by Li and
O’Brien.26 In village A, the relatives of a former village official were particularly
active in the protests, and many other villagers considered them as a “family of
heroes.” The background of the activists in village B was different. Here, a tra-
ditional organization, which promoted cultural traditions like dragon boat com-
petitions and lion dancing, concurrently served as an investigation bureau for
local government corruption.27 In both villages, the activists collected “evidence”
exposing the corruption of the Party secretary and time and again informed the
higher-level authorities about the alleged misconduct. However, the only sign
that their petitions were received was intimidation: activists in village B claimed
to have been repeatedly threatened by village officials and reported that one of
the petitioners, the nephew of a former provincial congress representative, had
his leg broken by hired thugs.28
At first, activists had difficulty in mobilizing villagers, who were reasonably
content with the income they received from renting out rooms to migrants and
the dividends they received as shareholders in the “collective company” that admi-
nistrated the collective land.29 As one of the activists put it, “you know, if Chinese
people have enough to eat and to drink, they usually do not protest.”30 However, a
larger part of the community became involved when residential land was targeted
for redevelopment before the commencement of the Asian Games in the city in
November 2010. The danger loomed so large that, as one interviewee put it, “we
will lose everything.”31 The villagers did not so much resent the redevelopment
itself, which came with the contracted right to a brand-new apartment in the rede-
veloped district. The problem was rather the lack of conviction that the village auth-
orities would honour their promises to compensate the property owners for the
temporary accommodation they had to rent while the development was under
way, and that they would respect the contract once redevelopment was completed.
Without adequate compensation, the villagers would lose their source of income as
well as their homes. Those who had not learned a trade would face poverty.
25 Li, Tian 2008.
26 Li, Lianjiang, and O’Brien 2008.
27 On the role of clan and other traditional organizations, see Tsai 2007.
28 Interviews BM2; Petition letter written by protesters in village B, 7 September 2009. The use of hired
thugs to enforce local orders is not a recent phenomenon. See Yu 2003a.
29 Interviews BI1-5; Interview BM6; Interviews Sun.
30 Interviews Sun. This explanation resonates with Lynn T. Whyte’s (2010) assertion that awareness of ris-
ing inequality and unfairness in China does not drive people to rebel because they relate personal well-
being much more with hard work, merit and luck.
31 Ibid.
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The Re-activation of Strong Social Ties
The very real threat of poverty or at least considerable financial losses provided
fertile grounds for the organized expression of dissent. Still, this fear does not
explain why the villagers participated in the demonstrations. Individual rewards
were not handed out, and non-participation would have been the rational choice
for each involved individual; by not participating, they would avoid the consider-
able danger of being detained, beaten or even imprisoned. If the action were suc-
cessful, they would still share the spoils. As the following paragraphs illustrate,
selective incentives are not a necessary condition to motivate participants in col-
lective action. Other, individual-based interests can fulfil that same role. In the
cases studied here, establishing informal norms and making use of family ties
explains not only the cohesion of the movement, but also the fact that large-scale
demonstrations could be planned without the knowledge of the authorities.
We refer to this process as the “re-activation of strong social ties,” by which we
mean the augmentation of the “weak ties” of an urbanized society with the exist-
ing but dormant “strong ties” of family, clan and kinship.32 This re-activation
mobilizes social capital to rally a large number of participants and to generate
trust in the integrity of the leadership, just as Elinor Ostrom has observed. In
addition, it serves as an effective social control tool that prevents free riding
and abuses of power. Village A and village B are very similar in that they are
single-clan villages. Arguably, a single clan is easier to coordinate than several
clans. This makes these villages different from other protest sites where protesters
cannot rely on such ties.
The ability to draw on both weak and strong ties is particular to chengzhong-
cun. On the one hand, villages A and B were no longer villages in the sense of
word, but rather neighbourhoods made up of people who earned their money
through office jobs, factory labour and subletting apartments. In the daily life
of the villagers, weak ties had become more important than strong ties. This pro-
cess was quickened by the influx of the resident migrants which had greatly chan-
ged the social fabric of the villages.
On the other hand, the rules and relationships underlying strong social ties had
not disappeared – they were just less utilized. Less interaction with family mem-
bers did not mean that “sharing the same root and the same clan” (tongzong
tongzu 同宗同族) had become irrelevant for the villagers. Several respondents
informed us that before the incident, clan ties had become increasingly unimpor-
tant in structuring their daily lives. Even blood relatives only infrequently called
upon each other. People made friends at work, made contacts with business
associates, or simply stayed at home and watched television. However, two acti-
vists recounted how the situation quickly changed once the villagers saw that
their livelihoods were threatened.33 Indeed, the impending demolition of their
32 Granovetter 1973; Granovetter 1983.
33 Interview AM1; Interviews AW1.
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houses quickly turned the villagers into a tight-knit, inward-looking community
bound by a common interest and loyalty to the clan. This effect was not lost on
the resident migrant workers, who suddenly found themselves excluded from
these activities and relegated to the role of spectators. As one elderly lady put
it: “We are just tenants here. We don’t participate. It’s none of our business.”
Hence, the strong ties of the family and the clan quickly replaced the weak ties
of everyday interaction in an urbanized society. The degree of group coherence is
illustrated by the fact that the demonstrations were organized without the prior
knowledge of village authorities, and it was demonstrated to us when we enquired
about the leadership of the demonstrations. At first, all of the villagers we inter-
viewed denied that the demonstrations were organized and instead claimed that
they had occurred “spontaneously” (ziyuan zifa 自愿自发).34 Later, when trust
was established, residents of village B frequently referred to the “organizers” of
the protests, and they made phone calls to unidentified individuals to ask them
if petitions and other material could be relayed to us.35 Finally, we were told
about the anti-corruption work of the dragon boat association and that it had
been disbanded by the local authorities in February 200936 because it allegedly
“represented the village without the consent of the village authorities.”37 As
the videos of the demonstration show, most of the more vocal activists in the
demonstration had belonged to this association.38 In village A, an informant like-
wise told us that there were indeed protest organizers.39
The existence of heightened grievances, a community held together by mutual
trust and a leadership group commanding a large amount of social capital were
critical ingredients for the mobilization of the demonstrations in both villages.
However, our interviews confirm Li and O’Brien’s observation that fear of
being ostracized by the community is a potent mobilization instrument as well.
Active participants in the risky business of demonstrating against official miscon-
duct were regarded as heroes, especially if they were arrested in the struggle for
the collective good. Non-participation carried the risk of social stigmatization.
In the tightly knit communities brought about by the re-activation of strong
ties, those excluded from the community risk having their weddings and funerals
boycotted and even the threat of physical violence.40
Interviewees in both villages reiterated that every villager had a responsibility
to participate in collective resistance and fight for the collective good.41
According to an informal rule, at least one family member should be represented
34 Interviews BI1-5; Interview BM4; Interview AW1. This is understandable, as forming an organization
without prior approval from the government is a violation of state security regulations and punishable
with long prison sentences. See Yu 2003b.
35 Interview BW6.
36 Interview BM2; Interview BM4.
37 Interviews BI1-5.
38 Interviews BM2.
39 Interviews Sun. To protect them, however, he did not identify them to us.
40 Li, Lianjiang, and O’Brien 2008, 7.
41 Interviews BI1-5; Interviews BW5.
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in such activities, or else face exclusion from the community. One old lady in vil-
lage B was very sceptical of collective action, as she still remembered being
struggled against in the Cultural Revolution.42 For this reason, she prevented
her sons from participating in the protests, but despite the fear of being punished
once more, she took part in the activities herself in order to prevent her family
from facing social sanctions.
The activists strengthened these rules by constantly referring to them. In public
meetings, for example, activists in village B exhorted villagers to be courageous
and fight to the end, and held themselves up as valiant examples of not being
“afraid of getting into trouble” for the sake of the public good. Non-participants,
however, were despised as cowards.43
The strength of these ties was put to the test when the authorities sent in the
police to break up the demonstrations and arrest the protestors; the cost of oppos-
ing the authorities had increased significantly. In both villages, activists and some
ordinary villagers were caught and detained by the police not only during the
demonstrations, but also over the course of the sit-ins that followed.44 At this
point, it had become clear to the villagers that they would not be able to rely
on networks such as those described by Shi and Cai. The smooth execution of
the Asian Games, scheduled to be held later in 2010, was the first priority for
all administrative levels from the central government downwards, and a strict
ban on negative reporting rendered engaging the media futile. Despite this, col-
lective action continued. Especially in village B, protest activities were attended
every day by a large and constant number of participants. In fact, facing a
superior enemy strengthened the collective identity of the protesters, heroes
were created on a daily basis, and their opposition to the local authorities became
more intense. This unity grew with each oppressive act endured.45
Adaptive Leadership
While heightened grievances, a charismatic leadership and re-activated strong ties
are enough to organize large demonstrations, these factors are not enough to sus-
tain collective action. This applies especially to contexts where collective action is
repressed by the authorities. In our two villages, this is exactly what happened,
and it is instructive to examine closely how the protest leaders reacted to this
challenge. It is in this respect that the differences between the two otherwise
very similar villages become apparent, and it is likely that this disparity accounts
for collective action breaking down earlier in village A than in village B. Most
importantly, sustained collective action requires an adaptive leadership, i.e. the
ability of an organization to adjust its strategies and frames when faced with
42 Interview BW6.
43 Video B1, showing the assembly in village B, Guangzhou, taken by villagers on 21 August 2009.
44 Interview AM1; Interview BM5; Interview BM6.
45 Interviews BM2; Interview BW4.
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challenges that threaten its survival. In village B, this entailed a) studying and uti-
lizing laws and regulations; b) adjusting routines and frames when faced with
repression; c) employing modern information and communication technologies;
and d) imposing a division of labour on the protesters. This kind of organiz-
ational learning, and especially the successful application of advanced infor-
mation and communication technologies, has received insufficient attention in
the literature on collective action in and beyond China.
While the leadership capacities of those orchestrating the activities in village A
basically stagnated, the protest organizers in village B proved capable of learning.
The former continued to rely on charisma and respect, which was bolstered when
two of the three organizers, a father and his daughter, were imprisoned for their
alleged leadership role in the demonstrations. An activist associated with the son
(who had not been arrested owing to a lack of evidence of his participation)
denied this charge and claimed that the protests in village A had no formal
organization. According to her, villagers assembled and prepared their activities
spontaneously. The young man whose father and sister had been arrested
regretted that they did not know more about the law, their rights or about run-
ning an organization, and believed that more knowledge about these issues would
have prevented many of the arrests.46
There is some truth to this. The mobilization in village B was more tightly
organized and the activists were better educated and more aware of their rights.
The young men who spearheaded the demonstration argued eloquently with the
village officials, and the videos taken of these confrontations show them citing
laws and regulations to justify their actions and to put the village officials on
the spot.47 However, they were also very careful to not break the law themselves.
Protest leaders reiterated the importance of keeping public order and “not
destroying public property” during the demonstration.48 When walking back to
the village compound at the end of the day, the protesters urged each other to
hurry up when crossing the main street in order not to block the traffic. It is prob-
ably because of their rights awareness and their more cautious approach that
fewer activists in village B were arrested, although their demonstration was larger
and lasted longer. In contrast, the activists in village A were reckless in confront-
ing the authorities and distributing the visual documentation of this confronta-
tion.49 Journalists who were present at the August demonstration recalled that
public thoroughfares were blocked with the help of trucks, which led to the arrest
of some protesters and two of the protest organizers.50 Such radical action is
often the result of extreme excitement and anger in the absence of discipline
and leadership in “spontaneous organizations.”51




50 Interviews Jia and Xi.
51 See Ying 2011.
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Another important difference can be found in the organizational structures
underlying collective action: in contrast to village A, where family ties served
as the only glue holding the protesters together, the activists in village B were
also able to make use of pre-existing traditional institutions. Arguably, this
enabled them to operate more efficiently and professionally than their counter-
parts in village A.
Organizational learning in village B became apparent in five additional
domains. First of all, the activists developed what might be called a “corporate
identity” to demonstrate their unity in the struggle against the village officials.
Second, direct action was routinized, which not only demonstrated perseverance,
but also imposed discipline on the participants. Third, modern technologies of
communication were employed to facilitate contact between the protesters and
rally support from outside. Relatedly, the protesters sought to enlist the help of
allies they considered powerful. Last but not least, a division of labour was
imposed after some of the organizers were arrested. Young men, the principal
wage earners in most families, coordinated the protests from behind the scenes;
those who participated in the sit-ins were mainly elderly people, many of them
women.
As for corporate identity, the participants of the sit-ins in village B were
clearly recognizable by their headgear: all wore red hats embroidered with the
characters for “fight corruption” ( fanfu 反腐). These hats were not worn
during the three-day demonstration, when protesters and onlookers were indis-
tinguishable. Interestingly, nobody admitted having bought these hats – accord-
ing to the villagers, “somebody” simply placed them “somewhere” in the village,
and the protesters simply helped themselves.52 We never saw the protesters in
village A wear any kind of uniform. One informant claimed that such
equipment had existed but was seized by the police,53 but this is difficult to verify
as none of the film footage of the protest shows the protesters wearing these
clothes.
Second, the participants of the sit-ins in village B developed a routine that
enabled them to continue the action without frequent leadership involvement.
Protestors appeared collectively at 9 am, returned home for lunch, and then
left the construction site at 5 pm. Not everyone made it on time in the morning,
but the protesters usually left together. They formed lines and marched towards
the village committee compounds, where they stopped to wave and greet the
mainly elderly protesters who had assembled there.54
Third, the younger and better-educated protestors were very active disseminat-
ing information and documenting the protests on the internet. As several studies
show, new media such as blogs, short messages and other forms of virtual com-
munication have become an important means for activists to communicate and to
52 Interviews BI1-5.
53 Interviews Sun.
54 Observations on 22, 29 and 30 January 2010.
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augment or even replace face-to-face communication.55 This was certainly the
case in village B, where innovations included the creation of a close-ended web
forum and a QQ (online instant messenger) membership group limited to village
members. This platform was reportedly used to share protest-related infor-
mation.56 In addition, the protestors in village B recorded many of their actions
on video and published several of these videos on various video-sharing websites,
including YouTube. Finally, they produced and circulated an agitation video.
This video shows stills and sequences of earlier protests, with revolutionary
songs with altered lyrics sung in the background. Appealing to the villagers’
sense of dignity, the makers of the video liken them to “lions waking after a
long sleep” and exhort them to stand up and fight against their oppressors.57
While the sit-in protesters came into direct confrontation with the authorities,
the young and better-educated villagers were soon engaged in an online battle
with the internet police. Many of the web forum posts that were deleted by the
administrators were quickly reposted elsewhere. Interestingly, the public blogs
and web forums (where videos of collective activities were posted) served as an
inspiration to protestors and villagers from other locations as well. This obser-
vation ties in well with recent contributions showing that protestors see the
media as a strategic ally, because media involvement often determines if a move-
ment succeeds or not.58 As this support was elusive in villages A and B, the young
men in village B sought to raise the public profile of their protest by alternative
means.
Finally, there was a division of labour in order to minimize the losses for the
involved families. As mentioned above, every family in village B was under great
pressure to contribute manpower to the protests, which explains the larger and
more regular turnout than in village A. Carefully weighing the risks and oppor-
tunities, each family made a decision on who should represent them in the sit-ins.
The participation of the young men, who had been active in the demonstration
and were easily identifiable on the videos filmed by the police, visibly dwindled.
Many of them were of course working on weekdays, but even on the weekends
only a few young villagers could be seen among those protesting at the construc-
tion site or in front of the village committee. We were informed that none of the
young activists who had been arrested in previous protest activities dared to par-
ticipate in further direct collective action. Those who had taken part in the dem-
onstration also decided to lay low even if they had not been arrested.59 Thus, it
was nearly impossible to recruit young men for direct collective action.
According to one elderly woman whose sons were both working in the public




58 Cai 2009; Chase and Mulvenon 2002.
59 Interview BW4.
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sector in Guangzhou city, the risk of being fired and forsaking a promising future
was just too big.60
As mentioned above, many young men continued with their resistance behind
the scenes and, particularly in village B, were instrumental in organizing and
coordinating resistance. Sit-in demonstrators mentioned that most of the material
used in the protests, such as petition letters, slogans, banners and printed hats,
were prepared by educated young villagers.61 In addition, those with influential
connections outside of their village thought that they would be put to better
use if they used their social capital to mobilize external supporters. Former villa-
gers who, according to rumours, were connected to higher-level authorities were
asked to draw the attention of their contacts to the petitions that had been filed.62
Villagers employed in the media sector were counted on to persuade their col-
leagues to cover the public meetings and sit-ins.63 Thus, young and male family
members, considered the backbone of the family economy, were soon given roles
that meant they were less likely to get caught. By planning and orchestrating col-
lective resistance from behind the scenes, the educated and male inhabitants of
village B soon vanished from the streets, and the protest crowd wore a radically
different face. After the demonstration, the sit-in protestors in village B consisted
mainly of middle-aged, senior and female villagers.
Our interviewees confirmed that they considered the risk of losing a young
wage earner much higher than allowing an old family member to get caught.64
In addition, the protesters displayed confidence that respect for the elderly
would inhibit the security forces from mistreating those protesters. Some older
protesters resumed their activities as soon as they were released from prison. A
retired man in his 60s almost immediately returned to the sit-ins after he had
served 20 days in detention: “When he saw me again here [at the site of the
sit-in], the policeman who had arrested me asked me why I still dared to come.
I said of course I come. I have to fight for my rights. Even if you hold your
gun to my head, I will still come here. We are not afraid because we have
done nothing illegal.”65 Besides showcasing the determination of many of the
elderly protesters, this example also makes clear that the activists might have mis-
calculated the resolve and ingenuity of the authorities. Reportedly, some men in
their 60s and early 70s were detained, despite their age. In contrast, sit-in protes-
tors in village B reported that the police did refrain from arresting an elderly acti-
vist when they heard that he was already in his late 70s. However, what prompted





64 Interviews BI1-5; Interviews Sun. This confirms findings by Kevin O’Brien and William Hurst that retir-
ees aged between 50 and 65 are more likely to participate in protests because they do not have to raise a
family and because they can draw on experiences of activism made, e.g., in the Cultural Revolution. See
Hurst and O’Brien 2002.
65 Interview BM4.
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custody. The police detained his son instead, although the young man had only
sporadically joined the sit-ins.66
The choice of who should protest also had a gender dimension. Our informal
survey revealed that the majority of the protesters were female, aged between 40
and 75 years old, and jobless. We were told that women who did not contribute
to the family income were selected for participation in the protests because it
would hurt the family less if the police caught them. In addition, we learned
that women were less likely to be arrested as they were deemed incapable of play-
ing a major role in the protests. Finally, for whatever reasons, women were more
likely than their male counterparts to shield themselves from the police cameras
by covering their face with hats, hands or umbrellas.
Framing Resistance
As pointed out in the introduction, some scholars emphasize the importance of
narratives around which collective action is organized. Our findings confirm
the importance of common frames that give collective action meaning. They
aid the participants in making sense of their actions, assuring them that what
they are doing benefits the common good. On the other hand, such frames can
also be directed outward in that they serve as a common base on which alliances
between like-minded groups can be forged. Again, village B performed much bet-
ter in this dimension than village A.
In village A, the demonstrators demanded higher compensation and justified
this with their poor living conditions. Allegations of corruption were also raised,
but they played a secondary role in communicating their aims. In village B, the
activists were well aware that their success relied on the enlistment of two power-
ful allies: the media and higher-level governments. This, they reasoned, could best
be achieved if they rallied their particular interests behind the struggle for a public
good, especially if it was high on the central government’s priority list. Although
the goal of the activists was increased control over land conversion, the protests
were more generally directed against the alleged corruption and malfeasance of
the village authorities. In fact, the protesters made the resolving of the “corrup-
tion problem” a precondition for engaging in redevelopment talks with the village
authorities. Bringing down the incumbent village government on corruption
charges would enable villagers to elect a village committee that was more sym-
pathetic to the interests of the house owners, who were all shareholders in the
“village cooperation company” that administered the collective land, but who
were not granted any influence in the conversion process.
Activists in village B also sought to create a sense of community by defining
themselves as part of a national anti-corruption drive. For example, when
asked what they were doing, one of the elderly ladies we interviewed at the
66 Interviews BM2.
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sit-in site proudly answered: “Didn’t you read the newspaper? We fight corrup-
tion.” A younger respondent added, “We are China’s most stubborn anti-
corruption village.”67 As mentioned above, the long duration of the collective
action did not seem to tire people but, on the contrary, made them more defiant.
Those who were arrested or faced bullying were celebrated as heroes, and as time
went by, they began to avail themselves of class struggle rhetoric. Although many
of them had earned handsomely from renting out rooms, they portrayed them-
selves as the poor and oppressed who were forced to struggle against the rich
and greedy village officials.68 Allusions to the Cultural Revolution were made
by singing revolutionary songs, albeit with lyrics composed for the occasion:
corrupt village officials and police officers were criticized harshly to the tune
of “The east is red” (Dongfang hong 东方红).69 In addition, they borrowed the
theme tune of an old Hong Kong drama, Huo Yuanjia 霍元甲, about a group
of heroes fighting foreign invaders. The song is aptly named “The Great Wall
never falls” (Wan li changcheng yong bu dao 万里长城永不倒.)70
In sum, the fact that they were able to frame a group-based collective interest
as a public interest shows that the activists in village B had the ability to adjust
their agenda strategically to fit both their group-specific aims and the struggle for
a genuine public good.
Discussion
Given the focus on the technical details of collective action in much of the litera-
ture, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that it is not only success or failure that
changes the lives of those engaging in collective action, but also the decision to
take part. Suddenly and unexpectedly, the residents in our field research locations
felt compelled to leave their comfortable homes and become involved in a protest
routine of unknown duration that forced them to brave the heat, rain and cold as
well as the threat of arrest. As there was no register of attendance and “having
other things to do” was a legitimate excuse for absence, it is remarkable that
the sit-ins continued for so long.
We have identified four factors that influence the duration of collective action:
the severity of grievances; the capability of the organizers to frame their actions;
the ability to change leadership strategies when the need arises; and the avail-
ability of social capital to generate trust and prevent free riding. It is important
to note that this article is not concerned with the explanation of success or failure
of collective action, but the factors that help to sustain it. Although related, these
are different questions. As Cai Yongshun has convincingly shown, the former is
the eventual outcome of interactions between protesters and the government, and
67 Interviews BM7 and BW7.
68 Video B.
69 Interview BM3.
70 Video B. For the role of symbolic performances in protest activities, see also Wasserstrom 1991 and
Esherick and Wasserstrom 1990.
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by definition a zero-sum game. In contrast, this article is concerned with the fac-
tors that enable protesters to withstand increasing pressure, which is a matter of
degree. Eventually, both instances of collective action analysed here succumbed
to the pressure exerted by the local authorities, but it is relevant that village B
held out so much longer than village A.
Much of the existing literature has examined the impact of these four factors
on collective action in isolation, but our analysis has illustrated that they are clo-
sely interrelated. Grievances play a double function: the severity of the grievances
(how much is at stake) largely determines if collective action is initiated or not,
and how many participants can be mobilized. The nature of the grievance influ-
ences the second factor, i.e. the frames and strategies chosen by the organizers to
address this grievance. Although the grievances in village A and village B were
the same, the protest leaders in village B were far more adept than those in village
A at framing their protests as a struggle for the public good. While the former
used an anti-corruption, clean government agenda to unite their followers and
mobilize external support, the latter sounded more “selfish” by merely asking
for fair compensation.71 Social capital, the third factor, was the glue that held
the protest community together in both villages. It is remarkable that the thin-
ning out of family rituals and the diversification of life styles did not destroy
the family bonds that tied many of the villagers together. Family-based norms
and values could be reactivated overnight to turn a diverse neighbourhood into
a close-knit community. The trust produced by these ties allowed the surrepti-
tious mobilization of half the village, leaving the village cadres ignorant of the
plans for the demonstration. Finally, social ostracism also contributed to the res-
olution of the free rider problem in both locations.
While the above observations tie in well with the existing theoretical literature
on overcoming collective action problems, our study contributes new insights into
the importance of organizational learning. Unlike in village A, the protests in vil-
lage B became increasingly sophisticated. They combined petitions and sit-ins
with online activities: the internet enabled them to exchange information secretly,
and to communicate their goals and actions to the outside world. Finally, they
devised a division of labour to reduce the likelihood of the key organizers –
and breadwinners – being arrested. We hold this to be the main reason why
the protests in village B could be sustained for much longer than in village
A. It is very likely that the existence of a formal organization that could be
put to other use, and the experience of organizing events and coordinating
people were also crucial factors.
We believe that these findings can be applied to other localities as well. In their
study of rightful resistance, O’Brien and Li point out that indirect action often
turns into direct action if the authorities do not address the grievances of peti-
tioners. Given that the vast majority of petitions in China remain unaddressed
71 The choice of “anti-corruption” is not confined to our field locations, as Li, Lianjiang, Liu and
O’Brien’s (2012) account of petitioning in Beijing makes clear.
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and that land-related petitions have increased sharply since the early 2000s, it is
possible that there are many villages similar to the ones we studied. Local govern-
ments continue to attempt to hush up incidences of social unrest and such cases
are usually only reported when collective action becomes violent or when it is
successful.
Sustained collective action is a feature of the Chinese political landscape that
deserves further attention. As important as the factors and contexts that influence
if collective action succeeds or fails are those that determine how it succeeds or
fails. Many questions remain. Is there a geographical dimension to sustained col-
lective action? Are conditions for protracted resistance better where protesters
have access to social media? If so, how will the ongoing “informationalization”
(xinxihua 信息化) of even remote rural regions affect state–society relations in
China? What impact do the factors discussed here have on the progression of col-
lective action towards violence and accommodation? Finally, do different kinds
of pre-existing social ties have different impacts on the dynamics of collective
action? Were Granovetter and Putnam wrong to claim that weak ties are more
important than strong ties in sustaining collective action,72 or is collective
action most successful where organizers can make use of both weak and strong
social ties?
The findings in this article suggest the following tentative answers which need
to be tested in future research. Regarding geography, our findings lead us to
expect that collective action mainly occurs in urbanizing localities, where land
prices are increasing rapidly but local administrations lack the funds or are reluc-
tant to compensate farmers. In such locations, grievances are severe enough for
individuals to take to the streets despite the risk of crackdowns by the local gov-
ernment. In addition, proximity to the city allows organizers and participants to
utilize both strong and weak ties. Finally, the technologies and knowledge needed
to adapt protest leadership to changing circumstances and to disperse legitimizing
frames among participants and sympathetic external audiences are readily acces-
sible. For these reasons, collective action is easier to sustain in urbanizing or peri-
urban localities than in remote rural villages.
This insight also applies to the question of how the government-sponsored dif-
fusion of modern information and communication technologies to rural China
will change the nature of collective action in China. Our findings are quite
illustrative in this respect: although village A and village B are located equally
near to the centre of Guangzhou city, only the protest organizers in village B
used modern technology to communicate with the protesters and to make their
grievances known to audiences outside the village. As numerous studies have
shown, cellular phones, the internet and media such as microblogs and social net-
working platforms have changed the face of protest action in China in that they
provide unprecedented opportunities to obtain and distribute information.
72 Cf. Granovetter 1973; Granovetter 1983; Putnam 2000.
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However, the availability of these communication tools does not determine pro-
test outcomes. Protests could be sustained for so long in village B because the
organizers skilfully blended traditional and modern mobilization instruments.
As Papic and Noonan aptly put it: “social media are tools that allow revolution-
ary groups to lower the costs of participation, organization, recruitment and
training. But like any tool, social media have inherent weaknesses and strengths,
and their effectiveness depends on how effectively leaders use them and how
accessible they are to people who know how to use them.”73 Again, we believe
that it is more likely to find this combination of leadership quality and access
to technology in urbanizing areas than in remote rural areas.
As for violence and accommodation, our findings suggest that more sophisti-
cated protests such as those witnessed in village B are less likely to turn violent.
The organizers repeatedly urged the demonstrators not to violate any laws and
not to disrupt public order because they knew that violence would delegitimize
their protests and invite government crackdowns. While this is primarily the
result of a far-sighted leadership, other factors also have an impact on how pro-
tests turn violent. As the words and actions of some of our interviewees illustrate,
the authorities’ failure to respond to grievances becomes a grievance in itself.
While one might assume that non-responsiveness to a grievance kindles despera-
tion, we observed to the contrary that it strengthened a resolve to uphold one’s
dignity, even if this came at the price of physical integrity. This was reflected
in the legitimizing frames shared among the protesters, which became more rad-
ical after the authorities had cracked down on protest activities. Although scared,
the protesters would not allow themselves to be cowed into submission. A mix-
ture of peer pressure and stories of resistance elsewhere proved potent enough
to keep this resolve alive. Not surprisingly, protests can easily turn emotional
and spiral out of control when the authorities are perceived as unresponsive
and, depending on the circumstances, they can then take very extreme forms
such as violent disruptive action or public suicide.
Finally, the study also tells us something about the relationship between strong
and weak social ties, and once more we surmise that it is those localities which are
no longer rural but are not completely urbanized that have some distinct charac-
teristics beneficial to sustained collective action. In his 1973 essay, Granovetter
famously stated that “strong ties, breeding local cohesion, lead to overall frag-
mentation” of a community,74 and concluded that strong ties are an obstacle
to community organization.75 In contrast, weak ties link individuals to larger net-
works and thereby provide them with information and opportunities unaccessible
to members of inward-looking communities. While generally reaffirming his
argument, Granovetter does point out in his follow-up essay ten years later
73 Papic and Noonan 2011.
74 Granovetter 1973, 1378.
75 Ibid., 1373–76.
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that “strong ties have greater motivation to be of assistance and are typically
more easily available.”76
Our findings indicate that these categories should not be used too statically.
First of all, strong ties in changing societies can lie dormant and, as our examples
have illustrated, be re-activated. Second, and relatedly, this enables a community
to turn outward and, if faced with a common threat, turn inward again. This con-
stellation enabled village B to benefit from both kinds of ties: strong ties were the
foundation that ensured cohesion and trust within the community, while weak
ties allowed core individuals to interact with other networks.
It is questionable if this finding is valid for other social structures. The simul-
taneous utilization of strong and weak ties might be confined to the hybrid social
fabric of the peri-urban village. Here, many members have weak ties into the city.
However, at the same time dormant clan ties can be re-activated when the com-
munity is faced with external threats. In this respect, chengzhongcun and peri-
urban villages are different from either remote rural villages, where individuals
are primarily linked by strong ties, or from the cities, where weak ties tend to
be prevalent. This exceptional character makes chengzhongcun a subject for
further investigation.
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Appendix: Interviews
AM1, interview with male activist in village A, notes taken during interview, 8
February 2010.
AW1, interviews with female activist in village A, notes taken during interviews,
8 February 2010 and 22 February 2010.
AW2, interview with female activist in village A, notes taken after interview,
8 February 2010.
BM1, interviews with male protester in village B, notes taken after interviews, 27
January 2010 and 29 January 2010.
BM2, interviews with male protester in village B, notes taken after interviews,
29 January 2010 and 30 January 2010.
BM3, interview with male protester in village B, notes taken after interview, 30
January 2010.
BM4, interview with male protester in village B, notes taken after interview, 30
January 2010.
BM5, interview with male protester in village B, notes taken after interview, 10
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